Deregulation and the Marketing of Airline Carriers by Nicholls, J.A. F.
Hospitality Review
Volume 2
Issue 1 Hospitality Review Volume 2/Issue 1 Article 6
1-1-1984
Deregulation and the Marketing of Airline Carriers
J.A. F. Nicholls
Florida International University, hospitality@fiu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/hospitalityreview
This work is brought to you for free and open access by FIU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hospitality Review by an
authorized administrator of FIU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact dcc@fiu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Nicholls, J.A. F. (1984) "Deregulation and the Marketing of Airline Carriers," Hospitality Review: Vol. 2: Iss. 1, Article 6.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/hospitalityreview/vol2/iss1/6
Deregulation and the Marketing of Airline Carriers
Abstract
No student of the hospitality industry can long be insensitive to the role of air transportation in creating
much, though by no means all, of the "place demand" for his industry. This article confines itself to a
discussion of the impact of deregulation on carriers in the industry and discusses implications for the
hospitality field
Keywords
J.A.F. Nicholls, Airlines, Air travel, Discounting, Deregulation, Eastern Airlines, Braniff Airlines, CAB, IATA,
FIU
This article is available in Hospitality Review: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/hospitalityreview/vol2/iss1/6
Deregulation and the Marketing 
of Airline Carriers 
by 
J.A.F. Nicholls 
College of Business Administration 
Florida International University 
No student of the hospitality industry can long be insensitive to the role of air 
transportation in creating much, though by no means all, of the "place de- 
mand" for his industry. This article confines itself to a discussion of the im- 
pact of deregulation on carriers in the industry and discusses implications for 
the hospitality field. 
For many years following World War 11, there was virtually no eco- 
nomic competition between airlines flying particular paired routes in 
the United States and abroad. For domestic routes, the Civil Aeronau- 
tics Board (CAB) provided tight economic regulation; the Interna- 
tional Transport Association (IATA) did so for international routes. 
Price competition was virtually nonexistent. Route prices were ap- 
proved by the CAB or by the IATA. It was a warm and cozy oligopolized 
world for air carriers. Prices were a given, seldom discounted; traffic 
increased steadily with the "majors" dominating domestic routes and 
a select few flag carriers-mostly from America and Western Europe 
- emerging as the high volume international ones. 
Rivalry between airlines did not involve ticket prices. Passengers 
were provided steak dinners or complimentary champagne, wide pas- 
senger seats or more leg room, glossy airline magazines, etc.' As Sir 
John Hicks, a Nobel laureate in economics, once remarked in his clas- 
sic discussion of the benefits of cartels and other forms of monopoly, 
the main benefit was "a quiet life." There was no need, as the competi- 
tive model might suggest, to get up earlier in the morning, go to bed 
later at  night, and strive hard to get ahead or stay there. 
Domestic Deregulation Provides a Choice 
Today there is a choice in domestic flying: the brown bag or the red 
carpet. If you are not willing to haul your own luggage or pay a $3 fee 
for each piece of baggage you check in, provide your own lunch, and fly 
to and from nontraditional airports in unglamorous circumstances 
and surroundings on, as it is said, older model aircraft, then you can 
fly Eastern or one of the "major" carriers. (A major or "trunk" carrier 
is defined as being an airline with revenues greater than $1 billion a 
year. There are, with the recent rebirth of Braniff, currently 12 such 
major airlines in the United States). The watershed for the domestic 
trunk lines came in 1977-78. Air cargo was deregulated in 1977; pas- 
senger deregulation was set in motion, on a progressive basis, in 1978, 
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with the probable elimination of the CAB anticipated for the mid- 
1980s." 
The Humpty-Dumpty world of the major airlines was shattered fol- 
lowing these acts of deregulation. The trunk airlines, even the finan- 
cially strong and well-managed ones such as Delta and United, have 
been suffering grievous losses since 1979 when lean and mean carri- 
ers broke into their once lucrative cartel. Braniff went belly-up; Conti- 
nental is going through a major Chapter 11 reorganization and East- 
ern appears to be suffering from hemophilia. 
Should you choose to fly People Express, expect a crowd. This low- 
cost airline has consistently had a seat load factor of better than 80 
percent. (An airline's seat load factor is the number of passenger reve- 
nue miles as a proportion of the number of available passenger miles). 
Should you choose to fly Eastern, you will be able to assume a pasha 
position. In 1983, the airline had a seat load factor of 59 percent, in 
1982.56.6 ~ercent.  
Other majors fared equally poorly. For instance, in 1983 Delta gen- 
erated 26.8 billion revenue passenger miles and had 49.5 available 
passenger miles for a seat load factor of 54.1 percent; in 1982 it was a 
54.3 percent seat load factor. For Piedmont, it was 5.1 billion revenue 
passenger miles, 9.5 billion available passenger miles and a seat load 
factor of 53.7 percent in 1983; 3.8 billion revenue passenger miles, 7.0 
billion available passenger miles and a seat load factor of 54.3 percent 
in 1982. For all major airlines, revenue passenger miles were 241.6 
billion in 1983, available passenger miles 397.9 billion and a seat load 
factor of 60.7 percent; in 1982 their revenue passenger miles were 
223.6 billion, available passenger miles 378.4 billion and a seat load 
factor of 59.1 percent. 
A 55-60 percent seat load factor before deregulation would have re- 
sulted in a handsome return to the highly geared and coddled carriers 
under the watchful and solicitous eye of the CAB. In the deregulated 
domestic industry, this is no longer true; in fact, changed circum- 
stances have shifted the financial gearing against the majors. 
New Carriers Are Unaffected 
Several concomitant factors have brought about the change; to- 
gether their impact on the majors has been devastating. The new car- 
riers have been virtually unaffected. The basic problem for the trunk 
carriers is that the revenue variables for the airlines are no longer 
as predictable as they once were under the CAB'S administration. 
Stephen G. Breyer, now a judge on the First Circuit Court of Appeals 
in Boston and in 1974 a Harvard law professor who helped organize 
Sen. Edward Kennedy's Senate Judiciary Subcommittee's hearings 
on airline deregulation, remarked that the "classical CAB regulation 
continued forcing carriers to charge well over $1,000 for cross country 
 flight^."^ Cross country flights, as another subcommittee witness put 
it, were only 37 percent full. "The business traveler may be pleased to 
find an empty seat on which to put his briefcase. Would he be so 
pleased if he realized he was paying full fare for the brief~ase?"~ 
Even at 37 percent load factors, the regulated airlines could, and 
did, make money when seat prices were $1,000 each, discounting min- 
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imal. What has happened is that the intersection of economic growth, 
demand, and yield is now unstable. The major airlines, with heavy 
fixed costs inherited from their days of regulation, are in no state to 
fight off their new breed of deregulated competition. The major bene- 
fit of a cartel may be a quiet life; it also tends to make its members 
flabby. 
The majors are stuck with overcapacity, bloated labor costs, and 
high interest and fuel charges. Their new competitors are small and 
nimble. It is rather like the Fourth and Fifth centuries when the 
Huns, those lightweight, immensely agile, prairie horsemen, took on 
the heavily armored, but ponderous Byzantine cataphracti; even 
though outweighed, the lightweight troops were simply able to ma- 
neuver their unwieldy opponents and slaughter them. So long as they 
chose their ground, there was no contest. 
Even with load factors in the middle to high 50s, Eastern is losing 
money hand over fist. Economic growth has been relatively stagnant 
since 1979, though improving quite recently. Even though passenger 
demand will increase with economic growth, it no longer generates 
the yield that it did in the 1960s and 1970s. The available passenger 
supply of seats, as the overall figures for the majors indicate, has in- 
creased from 378.4 billion to 397.9 billion available passenger miles, a 
5.2 percent increase from 1982 to 1983. Even though revenue passen- 
ger miles have increased 8.2 percent in that same time period, growth 
has not overcome either the 1979-82 losses nor, more importantly, the 
sharp drop-off in yield. 
To hang on to their load factors, majors flying the dense north-east 
to south-east corridor routes have been trying to meet their $23 
(Newark to Washington), $69 (Newark to West Palm Beach), and $99 
(Syracuse to West Palm Beach) competition head-to-head. Even Delta, 
an airline which in the past has refused to be drawn into rate wars, has 
entered the fray. The alternative is too ghastly to contemplate. Better 
to fly with seats yielding up to $99 a trip on major routes than be flying 
empty seats at $149 or $169 each. 
At $100 or less per seatltrip, the new carriers can still make money. 
Flying at better than 80 percent capacity, People Express made an 
operating profit of $10.6 million in 1982. People Express was flying 
DC-9s, bought second-hand for a song, between low-rental airport 
sites. People Express minimized passenger services, charging for 
most of those that it did provide. Employing a non-unionized labor 
force, whether composed of pilots, flight attendants, mechanics, or 
other ground personnel, the airline had more flexible work rules. 
Eastern Provides a Contrast 
Eastern, in contrast, flies between prime real estate, paying the go- 
ing rates at the various international airports to which it flies; East- 
ern has a fuel-efficient, up-to-date fleet of A300s and 767s, together 
with some older aircraft like the LlOlls which it has sold, or is at- 
tempting to sell, to Third World countries, or elsewhere. A Boeing 767 
is a $40 million plane. Any time it is sitting idle on the ground, it is not 
repaying its purchase price.5 Even an elementary opportunity cost 
analysis dictates that it should be flying as long as it covers its mar- 
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ginal costs. On the other hand, the fact that it adds to capacity in a 
market where supply exceeds demand simply adds to the discounting 
potential. 
The Economist estimated that discounting reached some 80 percent 
of all fares offered in America in October 1982.6 The average discount 
mounted to 53 percent of full share, with some discounts rising as high 
as 70 percent. Besides, in its effort to keep a modern, fuel-efficient 
fleet, Eastern Airlines is in debt to the tune of more than $2 billion due 
to its recent purchases. In 1982, Eastern paid out some $178 million in 
interest payments as a consequence. In that same year, Eastern in- 
curred operating losses of $18.8 million. By 1983 these operating 
losses had escalated to some $405.1 million, reduced to $183.7 million 
by the judicious sale of tax credits. The need for a whole-blood transfu- 
sion appears imminent to many observers. 
Another reality is dawning on the trunk carriers. When the low-cost 
carriers first entered the various markets that they had targeted, the 
majors viewed them as a gnat-bite annoyance, but no serious threat. 
This view is rapidly dispersing as the winds of change blow through 
their once orderly citadel. People Express had merely 20 planes on its 
north-east to south-west route structure at the beginning of 1983. By 
the early autumn of that year, it was up to 32, with a growth to 67 jets 
projected by 1985.7 Southwest Airlines, another aggressive, low-cost 
competitor operating out of Dallas, is projected to grow from 25 air- 
craft at the beginning of 1982 to an estimated 56 in 1985.8 
Their increased capacity is causing these airlines, together with 
others such as Muse Air, Midway Airlines, and New York Air, to seek 
new routes. Muse Air, aided and abetted by Southwest Air, almost 
single-handedly destroyed the Continental and Eastern duopsony 
from Houston to Los Angeles, where the one-way coach fare for the 
two majors was $300. Then Muse and Southwest entered the fray. 
Muse dropped its fare progressively from $145 in April to $99 in May 
1983. Now there is a further threat to the majors; low-cost carriers like 
People Express are talking about entering the coast-to-coast markets. 
Donald Burr, founder and chief executive of People Express, is openly 
talking about a New York to Los Angeles or San Francisco fare of be- 
tween $99 and $119 later this year. The current regular coach price is 
$433. A seat booked weeks in advance, requiring a "red-eye" (over- 
night) flight, goes for $189.9 The threat of yet another price war is caus- 
ing collective corporate shudder among the trunk lines. 
Marketing Is the Key to Change 
Can nothing be done by the major carriers about this disruptive 
price situation? On a price basis, the answer seems to be a resounding 
"No!" The dilemma, recognized by a vice president at one major air- 
line, is "Either we don't match and we lose customers, or we match 
and then, because our costs are so high, we lose buckets of money."10 
Michael Muse, president of the airline named after him, puts the di- 
lemma more pithily when he says, "If you don't match, it's like slash- 
ing both wrists.''" 
What is emerging is a groping movement toward new marketing 
approaches. The key current one is aimed at the frequent traveler, the 
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business traveler who tends to pay full fare and is unable to book, usu- 
ally, sufficiently in advance to get the benefit of lower cost carriers. 
These frequent traveler programs were begun a little more than two 
year ago and elicited considerable response from the business flyer.12 
Although plans vary in detail, there are considerable similarities be- 
tween them. If a traveler flies, for instance, from 2,000 to 10,000 miles 
with a particular airline, he may be eligible for having his ticket up- 
graded from coach to first class. Travel over 50,000 miles may bring 
the reward of free first-class tickets. Travel even greater distances, 
and the frequent traveler may secure goodies like automobiles or ex- 
pense-paid cruises for two. 
The program is clearly working, even if it is causing some corporate 
headaches, as employees are having themselves sent along bizarre 
routes in order to rack up a few more miles with a particular carrier 
and its awaiting prize. 
The interesting point about the frequent traveler strategy on the 
part of the major is that it appears to be eliciting results. It also ad- 
dresses, through some creative marketing, a nub of their current prob- 
lem. The business travel market tends to be relatively concentrated, 
being composed of few travelers flying a relatively large number of 
trips. Demand for this portion of the market tends to be firm. Conse- 
quently, although the business travel market accounts for a small, but 
relatively stable, proportion to total airline journeys, it provides a con- 
siderably higher proportion of airline revenues. Aside from the ap- 
proach taken by Continental recently, or a modification thereof-that 
is, slimming and trimming a major airline by reducing labor costs sig- 
nificantly, probably through abrogation of union contracts - the fre- 
quent traveler program is one feasible marketing strategy for the ma- 
jor to adopt against its low-cost rivals. 
Hospitality Industry Is Affected 
In the sense that deregulation has resulted in much lower airfares 
on specific routes, one conclusion is clear for specialists in hospitality 
services. Passenger traffic between cities linked by low-cost carriers, 
almost invariably connecting major urban areas which have become 
prime demand locales for hospitality services, is going to steadily in- 
crease. In the longer term, of course, cities served by lower-cost air- 
lines will probably begin to develop a wider range of hospitality serv- 
ices, to the detriment of those, often in specialized resort regions, 
which do not enjoy the benefits of lower-cost air fares. 
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